(1) It is a violation of this chapter for a person to sponsor with actual malice:

     (a) Political advertising or an electioneering communication that contains a false statement of material fact about a candidate for public office. However, this subsection (1)(a) does not apply to statements made by a candidate or the candidate's agent about the candidate himself or herself;

     (b) Political advertising or an electioneering communication that falsely represents that a candidate is the incumbent for the office sought when in fact the candidate is not the incumbent;

     (c) Political advertising or an electioneering communication that makes either directly or indirectly, a false claim stating or implying the support or endorsement of any person or organization when in fact the candidate does not have such support or endorsement.

     (2) Any violation of this section shall be proven by clear and convincing evidence.

[2005 c 445 § 10; 1999 c 304 § 2; 1988 c 199 § 2; 1984 c 216 § 3.]

NOTES:

     Finding -- Intent -- 1999 c 304: "(1) The Washington supreme court in a case involving a ballot measure, State v. 119 Vote No! Committee, 135 Wn.2d 618 (1998), found the statute that prohibits persons from sponsoring, with actual malice, political advertising containing false statements of material fact to be invalid under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

     (2) The legislature finds that a review of the opinions indicates that a majority of the supreme court may find valid a statute that limited such a prohibition on sponsoring with actual malice false statements of material fact in a political campaign to statements about a candidate in an election for public office.

     (3) It is the intent of the legislature to amend the current law to provide protection for candidates for public office against false statements of material fact sponsored with actual malice." [1999 c 304 § 1.]