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City of Richland v. State, Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief
Not an official copy.
[Note: November 21, 2000 letter from the Thurston County Superior Court’s
Judicial Administrative Officer, John Sleeter, states that the three previously
filed cases involving I-722 have been assigned to the Honorable Christine A.
Pomeroy, and that "Judge Pomeroy will also be assigned to any other cases
involving I-722 that are filed in or moved to this county."]
SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR THURSTON COUNTY
THE CITY OF RICHLAND, a municipal corporation and political subdivision of
the State of Washington; and PIERCE COUNTY, a municipal corporation and political
subdivision of the State of Washington; Plaintiffs, v. FREDERICK C. KIGA, Director,
Washington State Department of Revenue, in his official capacity only; and STATE
OF WASHINGTON; Defendants.
No. _________________________
COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF
["Richland Complaint"]
Plaintiffs allege as follows:
- INTRODUCTION & SUMMARY OF THIS SUIT
- Introduction. This suit concerns Initiative Number 722 ("I-722").
That Initiative called for (1) nullifying and refunding increases in taxes,
fees, and monetary charges enacted after July 2, 1999, (2) reinstituting
the personal property tax exemption for motor vehicles, and (3) rolling
back property tax assessments to the level in effect on January 1, 1999
and instituting a taxation scheme that redistributes property tax burdens
from the owners of rapidly appreciating property to the owners of property
that is not rapidly appreciating in value.
I-722 is scheduled to take effect on December 7, 2000.
Implementing I-722 on December 7, 2000 will cause substantial hardships
and inequity. It will significantly cut plaintiffs’ 2001 general fund revenues
– which will require significant cutbacks in the health, safety, and other
services that the plaintiffs provide to their citizens. It will also shift
the plaintiffs’ property tax burdens from corporations and persons whose
real estate holdings have appreciated greatly these past few years to citizens
owning property that has not appreciated as much in that same time period.
These hardships and inequities cannot lawfully be imposed because I-722
is unconstitutional. Plaintiffs accordingly file this action to secure an
injunction prohibiting the December 7, 2000 implementation and enforcement
of I-722, and a prompt declaratory judgment confirming that I-722 is unconstitutional,
null, and void.
- Our Constitution Matters. One of the bedrock principles of government
in our nation is that all laws must comply with the Constitution.
That includes laws enacted through the Initiative process. As the Washington
Supreme Court recently confirmed in its decision striking down I-695, citizens
voting on an Initiative "are not superior to the written and fixed
Constitution", and thus they "must conform to the Constitution
just as the Legislature must do when enacting legislation." Over the
years, courts have therefore invalidated many Washington State Initiatives
which violated the Constitution – including:
- The Graduated Income Tax Initiative that passed by over 70%. Culliton
v. Chase (1933).
- The WW II Veterans’ Bonus Initiative that passed by 57%. Gilman v.
Tax Com’n (1949).
- The Death Penalty Initiative that passed by 59%. State v. Green
(1979).
- The Anti-Pornography Initiative that passed by 55%. Jones v. Charboneau’s
(1980).
- The Anti-Busing Initiative that passed by 66%. Washington v. Seattle
School District (1982).
- The Campaign Reform Initiative that passed by 73%. Washington Fed’n
of State Employees v. State (1995)(portions struck down).
- The Term Limits Initiative that passed by 52%. Gerberding v. Munro
(1998).
- The Three-Strikes-You’re-Out Initiative that passed by 76%. State v.
Cloud (1999)(portions struck down).
- The $30 License Tab Initiative that passed by 56%. Amalgamated Transit
Union v. State (2000).
- Safeguarding the Initiative Process. To safeguard the integrity
and fairness of the Initiative process in our State, our Constitution imposes
some basic requirements with which every Initiative must comply.
For example:
- Every Initiative in this State must present a single subject
instead of combining separate proposals in one Initiative. Article II, §19,
1st clause. This requirement protects the voters’ right to vote
"yes" on one proposal and "no" on the others, instead
of being forced to vote "yes" on all or "no" on all.
- Every Initiative in this State must have a ballot title
that discloses to voters what is buried in the fine print of that Initiative’s
text. Article II, §19, 2nd clause. This requirement protects
voters’ right to know what they are voting on when they read the ballot
title in the election booth.
- Every Initiative in this State must identify for voters
the existing statutes that a "yes" vote will revise or amend.
Article II, §37. This requirement protects the voters’ right to know how
the Initiative they are voting on will change the laws already on the books.
I-722 violates each of these Constitutional requirements.
- Promoting Fairness with respect to Taxation. To promote equality
and fairness among the citizens of this State, our Constitution also imposes
some basic requirements with respect to the collection of taxes and use
of the resulting public funds. For example:
- Our Constitution requires uniformity in real property taxes.
Article VII, §1. This ensures that citizens owning similar pieces of property
of equal value are taxed equally.
- Our Constitution bans gifts of public funds. Article VIII,
§§5 & 7. This ensures that once tax revenues are legally collected from
the citizenry as a whole, they are not then given away to be put in the
pockets of some.
I-722 violates each of these Constitutional requirements as well.
- Upholding the Constitution. In short, I-722 violates many provisions
in our State Constitution. Plaintiffs therefore file this suit to secure
a court ruling that upholds and enforces our Constitution by declaring Initiative
722 unconstitutional and enjoining its December 7, 2000 implementation and
enforcement.
- PARTIES
- Plaintiff City of Richland. The plaintiff City of Richland ("Richland")
is a municipal corporation and political subdivision of the State of Washington
validly formed and existing under the Constitution and laws of the State
of Washington, and has satisfied all conditions precedent to bring this
suit. Richland will be directly and adversely affected if Initiative 722
is found to be constitutional or implemented commencing December 7, 2000.
- Plaintiff Pierce County. Plaintiff Pierce County ("Pierce
County") is a charter county and a political subdivision of the State
of Washington validly formed and existing under the Constitution and laws
of the State of Washington, and has satisfied all conditions precedent to
bring this suit. Pierce County will be directly and adversely affected if
Initiative 722 is found to be constitutional or implemented commencing December
7, 2000. For example, Pierce County would be directly and adversely affected
if the taxes, fees, and other charges it adopted between July 2, 1999 and
December 31, 1999 were nullified and required to be refunded, or if the
amount of property taxes Pierce County may levy for collection in 2001 is
reduced below the limits otherwise allowed by law. Pierce County, including
its officers, employees, and agents responsible for implementing tax laws
in their jurisdiction will be directly and adversely affected if required
by defendants or otherwise to implement I722 effective December 7, 2000
with respect to all property and taxing districts for which they assess
and collect.
- Defendants. The State of Washington is charged with defending the
constitutionality of I-722, implementing I-722, and enforcing the provisions
of I-722. For example, through its Department of Revenue and its Director,
defendant Frederick C. Kiga, the State is charged with valuing certain taxable
property located within plaintiffs’ jurisdictional boundaries, exercising
general supervision and control over the administration of the assessment
of property and the tax laws of this State, over county assessors, county
treasurers, and all other county officers in the performance of their duties
relating to taxation, including giving order and direction to county assessors
and any other county officers as to matters relating to the administration
of the assessment and taxation laws of this State, and ensuring compliance
with property tax levy limits under Chapter 84.55 RCW. The State is also
a proper party pursuant to RCW 7.24.110.
- JURISDICTION & VENUE
- Jurisdiction. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this
action pursuant to RCW 7.24.010 and .030 because this action presents a
judiciable controversy between the plaintiffs and the defendants regarding
the parties’ rights and obligations under Initiative 722. This is an actual
and existing dispute within the meaning of chapter 7.24 RCW, between the
parties with genuine and opposing interests which are direct and substantial,
a judicial determination of which will be final and conclusive. This Court
also has jurisdiction by virtue of RCW 2.08.010, RCW 4.12.010 & .020(2),
RCW 36.01.050, and RCW 7.40.010.
- Venue. Venue for this action properly lies in this Court with respect
to the defendant State under RCW 4.92.010 with respect to the defendant
Kiga under RCW 4.12.020(2).
- BACKGROUND
- Initiative 695
- Initiative 695. Initiative 695, commonly referred to as the "$30
License Tab Initiative", was enacted by approximately 56% of the voters
in the November 1999 general election. Initiative 695 proposed (1) limiting
license tabs to $30 and (2) requiring voter approval of increases in taxes,
fees, and monetary charges. In October 2000, the Washington Supreme Court
issued a decision declaring Initiative 695 unconstitutional.
- Initiative 722
- Submission of Initiative 722. The proponents of I-695 submitted
Initiative 722 to the Washington Secretary of State for inclusion on the
November 2000 ballot before the Supreme Court issued its decision concerning
the constitutionality of I-695.
- "Son of 695". Throughout the election campaign, the proponents
of Initiative 722 referred to Initiative 722 as "Son of 695".
- Statewide November 2000 Vote. A majority of the Washington State
voters who voted in the November 7, 2000 general election voted in favor
of Initiative 722 ("I-722").
- Ballot Title. The ballot title for I-722 was: "Shall certain
1999 tax and fee increases be nullified, vehicles exempted from property
taxes, and property tax increases (except new construction) limited to 2%
annually?" A true and correct copy of that Ballot title is attached
as Exhibit A.
- Initiative Text. The full text of I-722 is attached as Exhibit
B, and is incorporated into this paragraph as if fully set forth verbatim.
- No Similar Measures. No measures with provisions similar to those
in I-722 were included on the November 7, 2000 ballot.
- Effective Date. Unless enjoined, I-722 will take effect on December
7, 2000. Unless an injunction is issued, upon that effective date the defendants
are obligated to comply with, implement, and enforce that new law.
- Impacts of November 7 Implementation of I-722
- 1999 Tax Fee And Monetary Charge Increases. Plaintiffs have collected
increased taxes, fees and other charges adopted during the period July 2,
1999 through December 31, 1999. In some cases, plaintiffs have provides
services (as opposed to goods) in exchange for the increased charges.
- 2000 Property Tax Increases. Between July 2, 1999 and December
31, 1999, plaintiffs levied their regular property tax for collection in
2000. The levy exceeded by more than 2% the total regular property tax plaintiffs
levied for collection in 1999 and was plaintiffs’ highest lawful levy during
the preceding three year period.
- 2001 Property Taxes. Plaintiffs levy in November 2000 regular property
taxes for collection in 2001, and will be certifying their property tax
levy for 2001 to the Assessor in their respective jurisdiction and directing
the Assessor and Treasurer in their jurisdiction to fully collect that 2001
property tax levy. The amount of the levy exceeds both the amount of regular
property taxes plaintiffs levied for collection in 1999 and the amount of
regular property tax plaintiffs levied for collection in 2000.
- Property Tax Reductions. Pursuant to the Director’s advice and
direction, unless enjoined, the Assessors in plaintiffs’ jurisdictions may
be required to certify an amount less than the lawful levy plaintiffs would
otherwise be allowed to levy for collection in 2001, and limit plaintiffs’
regular property tax levy to an amount no greater than 2% higher than the
levy for collection in 1999 plus new construction.
- 2001 Levy Timing. Pursuant to the Director’s advice and direction,
unless enjoined, the Assessors in plaintiffs’ jurisdictions may be required
to disregard the fact that plaintiffs levied their taxes for collection
in 2001 before I-722’s effecting date.
- Refunds. Unless enjoined, plaintiffs and the Assessors and Treasurers
in plaintiffs’ jurisdictions may be required by the Director’s advice and
direction to, upon request, refund pursuant to I-722 that portion of property
taxes found to be a "tax increase" adopted between July 2, 1999
and December 31, 1999 by any taxing district within plaintiffs’ jurisdiction.
- 2001 Levy Cuts. Based on the Director’s advice and direction, unless
enjoined, the Assessors in plaintiffs’ jurisdictions may be required to
limit levies for 2001 collection to 102% of the amount of the regular property
tax levied for collection in 1999, rather than allow up to 106% of the amount
of regular property taxes levied for collection in 2000, or even 102% of
the amount of regular property taxes levied for collection in 2000.
- Bonds. Plaintiffs have issued and sold Bonds, to which some of
the increases taxes, fees, and monetary charges adopted between July 2 and
December 31, 1999 are pledged.
- 2001 Levy Impact. If fully implemented as written on December 7,
2000, I-722 will prevent the Assessor and Treasurer in plaintiffs’ jurisdictions
from collecting the 2001 property tax levy already approved by the plaintiffs
and certified to the Assessor in their jurisdiction, and will require the
recalculation of the levy lids and levy amounts to be significantly lower.
- Significantly Cutting Plaintiffs’ General Fund. If fully implemented
as written on December 7, 2000, I-722 will significantly reduce the plaintiffs’
General Fund.
- Contract Impairment. If fully implemented as written on December
7, 2000, I-722 will, as a practical matter, impair Richland’s contracts
with its bondholders and with its ratepayers, and may similarly impair Pierce
County’s contracts with its bondholders and with its ratepayers.
- Substantial Cutbacks. If fully implemented as written on December
7, 2000, I-722 will also force the plaintiffs to execute significant cutbacks
in health, safety, or other services provided to its citizens.
- Tax Inequities. If fully implemented as written on December 7,
2000, I-722 will force the real estate tax burdens within the plaintiffs’
jurisdiction to be redistributed from the owners of rapidly appreciating
real property to citizens owning property that has depreciated, remained
stable, or appreciating less rapidly. That inequitable tax-reallocation
scheme will redistribute the real property tax burdens in plaintiffs’ jurisdiction
to citizens whose property has appreciated less than the jurisdiction-wide
average since 1999 in each of the plaintiffs’ jurisdictions.
- Inefficient Tax Collection. If fully implemented as written on
December 7, 2000, I-722 will cause confusion, unfairness, and delays in
the redistribution of tax burdens and collections of the same. It will also
cause the plaintiffs to incur needless administrative costs in attempting
to comply with the Initiative’s provisions – e.g., its provisions requiring
the recalculation of levies and levy lids, requiring artificial "1999"
reappraisals for new construction and improvements, and requiring "refunds"
to the "taxpayer" for increased taxes, fees, and other monetary
charges collected since July 1999. Those costs and payments cannot as a
practical matter be recovered after the courts invalidate I-722. Moreover,
unless enjoined, the Assessors in plaintiffs’ jurisdictions may be required
by the Director’s advice and direction to immediately, upon I-722’s December
7, 2000 effective date, incur the expense and effort of revising assessments
upon which property tax collectible in 2000 and 2001 are based to reflect
retroactive 1999 values, 1999 construction costs, the portions of value
of each property attributable to repair or maintenance, construction costs
exceeding 1999 rates, and to recompute all values, taxes and refunds for
2000 and 2001, and to provide many of those values and limits to other taxing
districts with no time for implementation, budgeting, and with no reimbursement
of the cost of this unfunded mandate.
- Need for Equitable Remedy. As a direct and immediate result of
the defendants’ actions in implementing and enforcing I-722, plaintiffs
will suffer immediate, actual, and substantial harm for which there is no
plain, complete, speedy or adequate remedy at law.
- Public Import. The real merits of this controversy are unsettled
and, without a judgment in this suit, questions of great public importance
in plaintiffs’ jurisdictions concerning the constitutionality of implementing
and enforcing I-722 will continue to exist.
- DECLARATORY JUDGMENT CLAIM
- Incorporation. Plaintiffs incorporate in this paragraph the allegations
in the other portions of this Complaint to the extent they are not inconsistent
with this Declaratory Judgment Claim, and in addition allege:
Constitution’s "Single-Subject" Requirement
- Constitution. An Initiative that submits two different proposals
in one ballot measure is not fair to voters – for it robs them of a fair
choice, and forces them to vote either for both proposals
or against both proposals. The single-subject rule in Article
II, § 19 of our Constitution protects voters from being forced into that
predicament, and thereby safeguards voters’ right to vote for one
proposal and against the other if they so choose.
- Violation. I-722 violated our Constitution’s single-subject requirement.
For example, the I-722 ballot presented at least three different proposals
to the voters, and required each voter to vote "yes" on all three
as a group or "no" on all three as a group:
(1) Do you want 1999 tax and fee increases nullified?, and
(2) Do you want vehicles exempted from property taxes?, and
(3) Do you want property tax increases limited to 2% annually?
Constitution’s "Subject-In-Title" Requirement
- Constitution. An Initiative can mislead voters if the fine print
buried in its text goes beyond what the average voter would think
he or she is voting on by reading the Initiative’s ballot title.
Article II, § 19 of our Constitution accordingly establishes a "subject-in-title"
requirement that bars an Initiative’s text from going beyond the subject
disclosed to voters in the ballot title.
- Violation. I-722 violated our Constitution’s "subject-in-title"
requirement. For example, the I-722 ballot title violated this constitutional
requirement by:
(1) asking voters if they wanted 1999 tax and fee increases "nullified"
– without disclosing to them that the text also required public funds legally
collected in 1999 and 2000 to be "refunded";
(2) asking voters if they wanted 1999 "tax and fee"
increases nullified – without disclosing to them that the text dramatically
expanded that nullification with a sweeping definition of "tax"
that encompassed not simply "taxes" and "fees", but
also "any ... monetary charge" collected
by a government entity – including, e.g., "water, sewer, and other
utility charges".
(3) asking voters if they wanted property tax increases "limited
to 2% annually" – without disclosing to them that the text
also rolled back property taxes to be based on assessments
in effect on January 1, 1999 – i.e., a roll-back to assessments determined
on February 15, 1998 at the very latest.
(4) asking voters if they wanted property tax increases "limited"
to 2% annually – without disclosing to them that the text also completely
eliminated tax liability attributable to certain types of construction.
Constitution’s "Full Disclosure" Requirement
- Constitution. Fairness dictates that an Initiative disclose to
voters how a "yes" vote will amend or revise the laws that already
exist in this State. Accordingly, Article II, § 37 of our Constitution requires
an Initiative to tell voters which statutes it would amend or revise.
- Violation. I-722 violates that full disclosure requirement, and
alters existing statutes without identifying those statutes for the voters.
For example, this Initiative’s provision mandating the refund of "water,
sewer, and other utility charges" already collected in 1999 and 2000
to cover the costs of operating municipal water and sewer systems amends
statutes such as chapters 36.94, 35.67 and 35.92 RCW, which mandate that
municipal utilities cannot operate at a loss and must therefore set (and
collect) sufficient water, sewer, and other utility rates to fully fund
the utility’s costs of operation. Other examples include, e.g., the provisions
of chapter 84.12 RCW relating to inter-county operating properties, RCW
84.55.010, RCW 84.48.080, RCW 84.80.080, and the refunding rules in chapters
84.68 & 84.69 RCW.
Constitution’s Tax Equality Requirement
- Constitution. Article VII, §1 of our Constitution requires uniformity
in the taxation of real property. This assures that similar citizens owning
similar pieces of property with equal fair market values are taxed equally.
Indeed, such uniformity and equality in taxation is one of the cornerstones
of a fair and equitable taxation system.
- Violation. I-722 violates our Constitution’s requirement of tax
equality by taxing property at the old assessment values in effect January
1, 1999, plus inflation or 2% (whichever is less), instead of taxing property
at its current fair market value. That results in owners of depreciating
(or slowly appreciating) property paying taxes based on their property’s
fair market value, but owners of more rapidly appreciating property
paying taxes based on less than fair market value. That in turn results
in the property tax burden being shifted from the owners of rapidly
appreciating property to the owners of slower appreciating property.
(Depending upon how the defendants intend to equalize the State Levy pursuant
to RCW 84.48.080, a similar lack of equality and uniformity claim exists
with respect to any redistribution of tax burdens from more rapidly appreciating
property to slower appreciating property. Plaintiffs reserve the right to
add such a claim if the defendants’ determination with respect to such equalization
so warrants – e.g., if defendants decide to use the artificial 1999 assessment
plus 2% approach of I-722 rather than true and fair market value.)
Constitution’s Ban Against Gifts of Public Funds
- Constitution. Article VIII, §§ 5 & 7 of our Constitution ban
municipalities from making gifts of public funds to private parties. This
helps ensure that taxes validly collected from the citizenry as whole cannot
be simply given away to select citizens.
- Violation. I-722 violates that ban by mandating that the plaintiffs
make payments out of then current public funds to certain citizens who previously
paid valid taxes, fees, and monetary charges (e.g., charges for the City
or County services they received). Indeed, the Washington Supreme Court
has confirmed that "refunding" taxes after they have been lawfully
collected violates our Constitution’s ban against gifts of public funds.
Moreover, I-722’s nullification by a statewide electorate of local
"tax increase" ordinances also violates Article XI, § 12, while
its global nullification of state "tax increase" legislation
violates Article I, § 1(b).
Constitution’s Ban Against Contract Impairment
- Constitution. Article I, §23 of our Constitution also promotes
fairness by prohibiting laws that impair contracts.
- Violation. The provisions of I-722, and their implementation, violate
that ban by, e.g., impairing the plaintiffs’ contracts with their Bondholders,
and impairing their contracts with their utility ratepayers. Such impairment,
moreover, is not necessary to achieve any legitimate public purpose.
Constitution’s Ban Against Impermissibly Vague Mandates
- Constitution. Article I, §3 of our Constitution (the due process
clause) promotes fairness by prohibiting laws that are too vague.
- Violation. The provisions of I-722 violate that prohibition by,
e.g., imposing vague – indeed, incomprehensible – requirements such as those
contained in Initiative section 4(1) (requiring that "increases in
property tax ... shall be exempt from property tax").
Constitution’s Guaranty of Equal Protection
- Constitution. Article I, §12 of our Constitution (the equal protection/privileges
and immunities clause) also promotes fairness by prohibiting laws that treat
similar citizens unequally.
- Violation. The provisions of I-722, and their implementation, violate
that ban by, e.g., treating similar owners of real property differently
without a sufficient reasonable basis. For example, the inequitable shift
of tax burdens from the owners of property that is rapidly appreciating
in value to owners of property that is appreciating more slowly such as
the plaintiff taxpayers in this suit.
Unlawful Calculation Of Levy Limit
- Statute. RCW 84.55.010 authorizes levies of regular property taxes
in an amount equal to the limit factor (106%) multiplied by the highest
amount of regular property taxes lawfully levied in the three most recent
years. As noted before, the property taxes levied by plaintiffs in 1999
for collection in 2000 are the highest amount of regular property taxes
legally levied by plaintiffs in the three most recent years, and the inflation
rate as determined by the State (through its Department of Revenue) for
use in determining the limit factor under Chapter 84.55 RCW for taxes to
be collected in 2001 is 2.61%.
- Violation. The plaintiffs maintain that even without the future
levy capacity protections of RCW 84.55.092, its regular property taxes levied
in for collection in 2001 may legally equal an amount not to exceed 106%
of the regular property taxes levied in 1999 for collection in 2000, and
that due to the levy capacity protections the plaintiffs’ regular property
taxes levied in 2000 for collection in 2001 may legally equal an amount
in excess of 106% of the regular property taxes levied in 1999 for collection
in 2000. Unless enjoined, defendants will be required to apply the provisions
of I-722 in a manner that refuses to allow the plaintiffs’ maximum property
tax levy for 2001 to be 106% (or any higher figure) of the levy collected
in 2000, and instead limit that maximum property tax levy for 2001 as 102%
of the highest levy collected between 1996 and 1999. The defendants’ calculation
method, however, constitutes an unlawful calculation of the plaintiffs’
levy limit. If defendants "comply" with I-722 by ceasing to keep
and update records on the value of taxable property at its true and fair
market value for debt purposes and the calculation of debt – or direct or
advise Assessors to do so – defendants will also violate (or at least prevent
compliance with) the debt capacity provisions of Article VIII, §6 of our
State Constitution and its implementing statutes..
Declaratory Judgment Conclusion
- Unconstitutionality and Illegality Of I-722. Washington law entitles
plaintiffs to a declaratory judgment that I-722 is invalid, null, and void
under the Washington State Constitution. For example, I-722 violates:
(a) Article II, §19, 1st clause (single-subject requirement
for Initiatives);
(b) Article II, §19, 2nd clause (subject-in-title requirement
for Initiatives)
(c) Article II, §37 (full disclosure rule for Initiatives);
(d) Art. VII, §1 (requirement of equal real estate taxation)
(e) Art. VIII, §§ 5 & 7 (ban on gift of public funds) and Art. XI,
§ 12 & Art. I, § 1(b) (both re limitations on ordinance or legislation
nullification);
(f) Art. I, §23(ban on impairment of contracts);
(g) Art. I, §3 (due process clause/void for vagueness); and
(h) Art. I, §12(prohibition against unequal treatment of citizens).
I-722, as being threatened to be implemented by the defendants, also results
in an unlawful calculation of the levy lid, and will violate (or at least
prevent compliance with) the debt capacity provisions of Article VIII, §6
of our State Constitution and its implementing statutes.
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF CLAIM
- Incorporation. Plaintiffs incorporate in this paragraph the allegations
in the other portions of this Complaint to the extent they are not inconsistent
with this Injunctive Relief Claim, and in addition allege:
- Clear Legal Right. I-722 is unconstitutional in many respects.
As a matter of constitutional law, I-722 is null, void, and unenforceable.
Plaintiffs have a clear legal or equitable right to not be subjected to
the implementation or enforcement of a law, such as I-722, that violates
our Constitution. Plaintiffs also have a clear legal or equitable right
to not be subjected to the implementation of a law that results in the unlawful
calculation of the plaintiffs’ levy lid.
- Well Grounded Fear Of Invasion. Plaintiffs have a well grounded
fear of an immediate invasion of their above rights (e.g., upon the defendants’
December 7 implementation or enforcement of I-722).
- Substantial Injury. The December 7, 2000 implementation of I-722
will result in actual and substantial injury to plaintiffs.
- Injunction. Plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary and permanent
injunction barring implementation and enforcement of I-722.
- Balance Of Interests. The balance of interests between the parties,
as well as the interests of the public in having the Courts of this State
uphold and defend our Constitution, also support the issuance of a preliminary
and permanent injunction barring implementation or enforcement of I-722
on December 7. The interest of the public in the efficient and fair collection
of taxes further supports the issuance of the injunctive relief requested
in this suit.
- RELIEF REQUESTED
Plaintiffs request the following relief from this Court:
- A preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining the implementation and
enforcement of I-722;
- A declaratory judgment declaring I-722 unconstitutional, and thus entirely
null and void;
- Plaintiffs’ attorney fees, expenses, and costs to the full extent allowed
by law;
- Permission to amend the pleadings to add additional claims or parties
to conform to the proof offered at the time of hearing or trial; and
- Such other relief as appears to the Court to be just and equitable.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22nd day of November, 2000.
JOHN W. LADENBURG
Prosecuting Attorney
BY: FOSTER PEPPER & SHEFELMAN PLLC
Thomas F. Ahearne, WSBA No. 14844
Special Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Attorneys for Plaintiff Pierce County
FOSTER PEPPER & SHEFELMAN PLLC
Thomas F. Ahearne, WSBA No. 14844
Attorneys for Plaintiff City of Richland
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